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Speed of human information processing (SIP) is a research
construct which has been examined under different names and
with different intensity for more than sixty years. Its importance is
briefly described in four research fields: differential,
experimental, aging and cognitive development. Since SIP
presents an important component of contemporary intelligence
models and life-span cognitive development research, an
attempt for the construction of an integrated SIP picture was
necessary. Review and systematic analysis of 42 research papers
and additional related literature showed that there are problems
with the validity of the SIP construct, but it also revealed other
theoretical and empirical inconsistencies. A new proposal for SIP
phenomena has been made, which abandons the SIP construct
with related measures, and introduces the RCP property as one
of the general attributes of every cognitive process.
Mislav Stjepan @ebec, Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar,
Maruli}ev trg 19/1, p.p. 277, 10001 Zagreb, Croatia.
E-mail: Mislav.Stjepan.Zebec@pilar.hr
PROCESSING SPEED AS AN IMPORTANT CONSTRUCT
OF HUMAN COGNITIVE FUNCTIONING
Speed of information processing (SIP) is probably one of the
most intriguing constructs in the research of human intellec-
tual functioning. In different times, under different names, it
was an object of intensive research in, at least, four psycho-267
logical research fields: (1) intelligence, (2) experimental cogni-
tive psychology, (3) aging and (4) development.
Intelligence researchers have rather thoroughly analysed
the speed of human information processing in their attempts
to explain human intellectual abilities. First, at the very begin-
ning of scientific psychology (19th century) when Francis
Galton tried to prove his eugenic theory of intelligence by
using reaction time in addition to other psychological and an-
thropometrical measures (Gardner et al., 1999). Later, during
the period when psychometric approach dominated the re-
search of intelligence, processing speed was considered as an
independent factor of non-hierarchical intelligence models
(e.g. perceptive speed in Thurstone's Primary Mental Abilities
Model) (Gardner et al., 1999), but mostly as a factor of hierar-
chical models (e.g. processing speed – second order factor in
Horn & Cattell Gf-Gc Theory and in Carroll's Three-Stratum
Theory of Cognitive Abilities) (Woodcock, 1994; Bickley et al.,
1995). The latest attempt started – and is still under way – with
the cognitive correlates approach to intelligence, where pro-
cessing speed is one of the key constructs of intelligence mod-
els, often labelled as mental speed (Kyllonen, 1994; Neubauer
& Knorr, 1998; Roberts et al., 1996; Roberts & Pallier, 2001).
On the whole, processing speed has been a clearly recog-
nised cognitive ability in intelligence research.
Experimental cognitive researchers had the task to pro-
pose the most complete theoretical model of human cognitive
functioning by analysing the flow of individual information
processes during solving some cognitive tasks (starting from
initial perception, through a series of other cognitive process-
es and resulting in either an observable response or merely in
a change of contents of the individual's memory). In that
sense, a wide variety of experimental designs and cognitive
tasks were designed to isolate the informational flow through
different cognitive subsystems (Vernon, 1994; Shepard & Metz-
ler, 1971; Sternberg, 1966; Posner & Mitchell, 1967). The time
spent in solving cognitive tasks specific to the defined cogni-
tive subsystems actually reflects the speed of information pro-
cessing in those subsystems. Later on, experimental cognitive
research comprising processing speed (or, more precisely, pro-
cessing time – the inverse operationalisation of processing
speed) started considering the problem of continuity vs. dis-
continuity of information processing (Levy and Pashler, 1995;
Mulder and van Galen, 1995). Experimental cognitive research
also analysed the relationship of processing speed with other
aspects of cognitive functioning, (e.g. errors during cognitive
task solving) (Nettelbeck, 1994; Coles et al., 1995), and with
other constructs important for the description of the human








Brandimonte et al., 1992). To summarise, experimental cogni-
tive research treated processing speed as a basic property of
human information processing which served as a key-means
for examining the components of informational flow through
the human cognitive system and its characteristics (continui-
ty, error probability, etc.).
Researchers of aging included processing speed quite
comprehensively in their attempt at describing the age of re-
lated changes in human intellectual functioning. The main
reason for that was the role of speed of information process-
ing in almost all contemporary models of intelligence and
great sensitivity of the processing speed to age related chan-
ges. The first research of the influence of age on processing
speed described the relationship between the rate of process-
ing in young adults and the elderly (Cerella, 1985). Further
aging research investigated whether the age related changes
of a wide variety of processing speed measures are indepen-
dent of each other, or whether they share a significant am-
ount of the variance (Salthouse, 2000). Timothy Salthouse sys-
tematically investigated the shared variance of age related
changes of processing speed and of other cognitive variables,
e.g. memory, reasoning, spatial abilities, etc. (Salthouse, 1994a,
1994b, 1998) and tried to define the mediation effect of age
related changes of processing speed on age changes of other
cognitive variables when they are not assessed in a limited
time (Salthouse, 1991, 1994b). Research often focused on the
relationship between processing speed and working memory
capacity in their mediation of age changes of higher cognitive
variables (Salthouse, 1991; Verhaeghen and Salthouse, 1997;
Stankov, 1999), and on the examination of the age-complexity
relation in adulthood (Salthouse, 1988). Finally, some com-
prehensive theoretical models of cognitive slowing in adult-
hood were proposed on the basis of processing speed (Myer-
son et al., 1990; Salthouse, 1996).
Developmental research of processing speed showed
that it was the most important, or at least second most impor-
tant construct (after working memory capacity) of the infor-
mation processing approach to cognitive development. De-
velopmental changes of processing speed were recorded very
early in developmental psychology through Smith's (1934)
research of age changes of simple reaction time on visual sti-
muli, and Goodenough's (1935) research of auditory reaction
time developmental changes (Wickens, 1974). Systematic re-
search of developmental changes in the speed of processing
started in the 1970s with the main objective of finding the me-
chanism of processing speed development (Wickens, 1974; Chi,
1977; Kail, 1986). The same objective has inspired researchers







important question of the research (whose solution implied
the answer to the mechanism of processing speed develop-
ment) was whether the developmental change of processing
speed is global, or process specific. Precisely, whether the pro-
cessing speed changes during the life-span in the same way
for all domains of human cognitive processing or if it changes
differently in different domains? If it is global, then the devel-
opmental mechanism is mostly (but not completely) deter-
mined by neurobiological factors – maturation. If it is process
specific, then it is mostly determined by experience – the prac-
tice and age changes of different strategies in cognitive task
solving. Although process specific explanation has some
remarkable evidence (Stiegler et al., 1988; Molenaar & van der
Molen, 1994; Ridderinkhof & van der Molen, 1997) there is
even more evidence for the global explanation of processing
speed development (Hale, 1990; Kail, 1991a, 1991b; Hale et al.,
1993; Hale & Jansen, 1994; Kail & Salthouse, 1994; Miller &
Vernon, 1997). However, for the purpose of this paper it is re-
levant to point out that the neurobiological mechanism (matu-
ration) of processing speed development – as a part of global
hypotheses – has been verified by some more direct research
(Eaton & Ritchot, 1995; Travis, 1998; Rose et al., 2002.). In the
last decade, the diversity of developmental studies on pro-
cessing speed has been enriched with quite a number of
research projects on the developmental relationship between
processing speed, working memory and some higher intel-
lectual abilities (Kail & Hall, 1994; Kail & Park, 1994; Kail, 1997;
Fry & Hale, 2000).
Finally, all this specific research of processing speed
development and its relationship to other cognitive functions
have given arguments to Andreas Demetriou to build one of
the most comprehensive theories of cognitive development,
which clearly incorporates the speed of processing as one of
three dimensions of the processing system – the core of the
human mind (Demetriou & Raftopoulos, 1999; Demetriou et
al., 2002).
A broad presence of processing speed in psychological
research certainly might be indicative for the fundamental
role of that construct in human intellectual functioning.
DEFINITIONS AND MEASURES OF SPEED
OF INFORMATION PROCESSING (SIP) – UNFINISHED STATE
In the previous section it has been demonstrated that speed
of information processing is a widely accepted and used con-
struct in several fields of psychological research, and there-
fore the need for its critical review and analysis might sur-
prise. Moreover, the idea becomes intriguing when one con-








has been treated like an important and inevitable component
of the human intellect by leading authors in the field of intel-
ligence research: Horn (Horn, 1968), Cattell (Cattell, 1971), H.
J. Eysenck (Eysenck, 1987), Nettelbeck (Nettelbeck, 1994), Car-
roll (1993), Vernon (1994), Stankov (1999), Roberts & Pallier
(2001), Deary (2000), Neubauer & Knorr (1998). It has also a
very important role in newer theories of cognitive develop-
ment (Platsidou et al., 1997; Demetriou & Raftopoulos, 1999;
Demetriou et al., 2002) and in research on age changes of cog-
nitive functioning during life span (Kail & Salthouse, 1994; Ce-
rella & Hale, 1994).
One of the methodological reasons for this construct
analysis is a confusion produced by the fact that the construct
of SIP appears in the literature at least under seven different
names (mental speed, speediness, speed of mental process-
ing, cognitive speed, processing speed, speed of information
processing, information processing rate), it is operationalised
with at least 98 different measures (which we reported in the
Appendix, according to research fields)1 and has at least two
complementary definitions connecting all these names and
measures (which we will mention at the end of this section).
This unfinished state of the SIP treatment in psychological
research can seriously influence the research orientation and
consequent errors in research projects including SIP as re-
search variable. Another, more important reason for this con-
struct review and analysis is the fact that the uncritical over-
taking, or uncritical generating of new measures for SIP from
the definition of that construct, leads to different and some-
times even opposite results in research. For example, a num-
ber of developmental researchers took some SIP measures
from differential research on SIP-intelligence relationship with-
out taking into account related dilemmas on the structure of
that construct. Consequently, they got different results about
the global/domain specific nature of SIP development (Kail,
1991b; Ridderinkhof, van der Molen, 1997). The very fact ob-
viously obstructs construction of a complete picture of the SIP
and its relationship with other cognitive constructs as well as
its role in human cognitive functioning. Therefore, a system-
atic presentation of possible problems with the SIP definition
and measures is needed.
Developmental Evidence of Inconsistency
The majority of problems most probably appear in those re-
search fields from which SIP does not originate, but the re-
searchers in those fields take it over from experimental and
differential psychology where it was originally introduced
and systematically examined. An example of such a research







viewing the content of 24 articles from that field (listed in the
literature of this paper) it was found that in merely four of
them,2 there is an explicit definition of SIP. That reflects either
the intentional avoiding of an explicit definition because of
the vague state of the construct, or neglecting it because SIP
is perceived as such a well-known and clear construct (some
kind of construct primitive in models of cognitive function-
ing) that it appears not to be necessary to be explicit. How-
ever, the complexity of the SIP definition is clearly visible in
the Fry and Hale (2000) review written on the relationship
among SIP, working memory and fluid intelligence during child-
hood:
... For many years, researchers interested in exa-
mining the relationship between the speed of infor-
mation processing and intelligence used very simple
tasks (e.g. simple reaction time or choice reaction time)
to measure the processing speed. The reason for u-
sing simple tasks was to minimize the contribution
of higher cognitive functions that would be includ-
ed in one's assessment of intelligence. Instead, the
speed of information processing was meant to cap-
ture the speed at which an individual completed ba-
sic cognitive functions such as identification or sim-
ple discriminations. Within this framework, some re-
searchers even attempted to distil the cognitive speed
from any motor speed involved in the actual execu-
tion of the response ... More recent findings from
multitask experiments suggest that speed of infor-
mation processing should be viewed as a general or
task-independent construct. The speed of informa-
tion processing of young adults has been found to
be highly correlated across different tasks that span
a wide range of complexity and the speed perfor-
mance on many different tasks improve in concert
during childhood, reflecting a global developmental
trend in processing speed... (pp 2-3).
These quotes indicate the unresolved status of the SIP
definition, and will be used later as argument for the propos-
al of a possible definition of a new construct.
A further problem concerning the SIP construct, especi-
ally its age changes, is the well-known and still unresolved
discussion on the global, or domain specific change of SIP
(mentioned in the previous section). Besides the difference in
approach to data analysis, the unresolved status of this dilem-
ma reflects also the differences in the used measures of SIP.
Namely, authors who argue global hypotheses use almost ex-








time per task – in paper and pencil tests). On the other hand,
proponents of domain specific hypotheses, besides mathe-
matical simulations, mostly use psycho physiological mea-
sures of SIP (different forms of event-related brain potential,
such as P3 latency and lateralized readiness potential onset)
and reaction time (RT) in Eriksson flanker task for which most
of cognitive psychologists state that it reflects interference
resistance – a measure of selective attention.
A further inconsistency, connected with the previous
one, which points at the unfinished definitional status of SIP
in developmental literature can be seen in the explanation of
developmental changes of SIP by Robert Kail – one of the
leading authors in the research of SIP development. Until 1994
he continuously argued (Kail, 1986, 1991a, 1991b) that one of
the possible mechanisms of age changes of SIP is the devel-
opment of processing resources, and in 1994 (Kail & Salt-
house, 1994) he concluded that SIP itself is a processing re-
source, crucial for human cognitive functioning. However,
the resource definition of SIP is clearly questioned in the work
of Ridderinkhof & van der Molen (1997). In that work the
authors argued that the regression approach – used by glob-
al hypotheses proponents – conceals process-specific age-
-related changes in processing speed, and therefore, they of-
fered the ANOVA approach for the analysis of developmen-
tal changes in processing speed. Furthermore, they gave em-
pirical evidence in the form of chronopsychophysiological
data, which clearly show a difference between the develop-
ment of perceptual processes and the development of re-
sponse-selection processes activated during cognitive task
solving.
The next developmental evidence of inconsistency,
which points to a more methodological aspect of SIP deter-
mination, is the fact that there have been found 58 different
measures of SIP (mentioned Appendix 1) in a review of devel-
opmental literature, with some of them widely recognized for
measuring other constructs in other fields of cognitive re-
search. For example, Stroop task, and Eriksen flanker task are
used as SIP measures in the research of SIP development dur-
ing childhood and adolescence (Kail, 1991b; Ridderinkhof &
van der Molen, 1997). At the same time they are widely ac-
cepted measures of selective attention in cognitive psycholo-
gy (MacLeod, 1991; Sternberg, 1996), and in newer theories of
cognitive development (Demetriou et al., 2002).
Another example is the difference in understanding SIP
measures between R. Kail (1991b) and A. Demetriou (et al.
2002), which has already been mentioned in the comment on
Stroop task, but it is also obvious in the research of Kail and







nition subtest of Peabody Individualized Achievement Test
(PIAT) is treated by Kail as a measure of higher cognitive abi-
lity (reading skill), while only a slightly different form of the
same test is treated by Demetriou as a representative measure
of SIP (Demetriou et al., 2002). In the same research Kail and
Hall use three paper and pencil tests of perceptive speed
(Coding Test, Visual Matching Test, and Cross-Out Test) for
measuring SIP, which – in the perspective of componential
analysis of task demands – are more complex than the Rea-
ding Recognition Test,3 thus disagreeing with the basic crite-
ria for the selection of SIP tasks (at least in earlier conceptuali-
sations of SIP).
Comparative Evidence of Inconsistency
There are some more examples from SIP studies that show the
lack of unanimity of the leading authors in the field concern-
ing the real measure of SIP, which are not restricted to cogni-
tive development research.
It was already mentioned that Demetriou (et al. 2002), in
his theory of cognitive development, suggests the speed of
single-word reading in one's native language as an appropri-
ate SIP measure. On the other hand, Salthouse (1996), in pre-
senting his theory of cognitive aging, as example of an inap-
propriate measure of SIP mentions exactly the tasks of read-
ing speed. In the same article, Salthouse suggests that paper
and pencil tasks of perceptive speed are appropriate mea-
sures of SIP, which Stankov (1999) criticises as inappropriate,
since these tasks include attention mechanisms of visual search
which are clearly treated differently from SIP in cognitive cor-
relate approach to intelligence research.
The next example of inconsistent treatment of SIP mea-
sures comes from differential psychology, more specifically,
from the cognitive correlate approach to intelligence re-
search. In their analysis of the basic information processing
(BIP) unit, Roberts, Pallier and Stankov (1996) used reaction time
(RT) in 10 computerised elementary cognitive tasks (ECT),
clearly differentiating them from the tests of clerical-percep-
tive speed, which constitute the Gs factor of wide cognitive
ability in the Horn-Cattell theory of intelligence. On the other
hand, Neubauer and Knorr (1998) used the well-known chro-
nometric ECTs of short-term memory scanning (Memory Scan-
ning Test) and long-term memory retrieval (Letter Matching
Test) to construct appropriate paper and pencil tests. These
paper and pencil tests, according to my assessment of their
cognitive and motor content, belong to the group of standard
clerical-perceptive speed tests, but – unlike Roberts, Pallier
and Stankov – Neubauer and Knorr (together with Coding








Furthermore, Roberts, Pallier and Stankov used Colour
Stroop Test in the same research (1996) as a measure of cleri-
cal-perceptive speed, which has already been mentioned as a
widely accepted measure of selective attention in cognitive
psychology. Additionally, they also used Multitask Card-Sor-
ting and Multitask Word Classification as measures of SIP, and
these tests clearly demand cognitive processes of divided at-
tention which should not be present in SIP tasks – at least
according to some earlier definitions of that construct.
The next example of inconsistency comes from the Neu-
bauer and Bucik (1996) analysis of mental speed-IQ relation-
ship, where they clearly distinguished paper and pencil tests
of SIP (Lindley's Coding Test, Posner's Letter Matching Test
and Sternberg's Memory Scanning Test) from processing
speed subtests in the Berlin Intelligence Scale (BIS) which they
treated as intelligence measures. On the other hand, Wilhelm
and Schulze (2002) used exactly these processing speed sub-
tests of BIS as SIP measures in their research of the relation of
speeded and unspeeded reasoning with mental speed.
Finally, concerning the SIP construct a comparative ob-
servation should be proposed pointing to at least a partial
inconsistency in the material aspect of the SIP definition. Na-
mely, in various models of cognitive functioning the SIP and
working memory (WM), together with attention (in some of
the models) are treated as equivalent key-factors/constructs of
intellectual functioning. On the other hand, WM and atten-
tion have relatively precisely defined and localised the bio-
logical substrate (Kinchla, 1992; LaBerge, 1995; Awh and Jo-
nides, 2001; Smith and Jonides, 1998) while SIP does not have
it. This fact becomes problematic in terms of internal consis-
tency of the models of human intellect, which treat these
three constructs as dimensions spanning all cognitive pro-
cesses (while two dimensions have relatively precisely deter-
mined the biological substrate, the third one does not have it).
One example of such a model is the processing system in the
Three-level theory of developing mind (Demetriou & Raf-
topoulos, 1999; Demetriou et al., 2002), where SIP, WM and
attention are treated as three dimensions of the system. The
second example comes from differential psychology where
Carroll's Three-stratum theory of cognitive abilities (Bickley
et al., 1995) and Horn-Cattell's Gf-Gc theory of intelligence
(Woodcock, 1994) are found. In these models of human cog-
nitive abilities SIP and WM have a crucial position as second
order factors in the hierarchy and should be treated as equi-
valent (although there are frequent debates which of the two
constructs is more important for the definition of g). The third







es the equivalent role of SIP, WM and attention, is Kail and
Salthouse's explanation of life-span changes of SIP, which
consider SIP as a mental resource (Kail & Salthouse, 1994). In
this explanation the authors introduce a concept of mental
resource, which has clearly defined characteristics and a rela-
tively strong analogy to three physical resources: time, space
and energy. All of them are respectively – on an analogical
level – connected with three key-characteristics of the pro-
cessing system of human cognition: SIP, WM and attention.
Definitions and Measures Résumé
Previous discussion clearly shows that the comprehension
and treatment of SIP within the same, but also in different
research fields, are not integrated. It is, therefore, rational to
wonder why.
One important reason is certainly the lack of a unique
and existence of rather complementary definitions of SIP (which
stress different aspects of the phenomena), from which nu-
merous related measures of the construct are derived. That
might be a consequence of the multifaceted nature of SIP
(Stankov, 1999). However, the problem stems from a great
number of different operationalisations of SIP thus suggest-
ing that every cognitive subsystem should present one facet –
and there are plenty of them.
Although it was stressed at the beginning of this section
(by using the words of Astrid Fry and Sandra Hale) that there
are some problems with the SIP definition, for the purpose of
this paper it is important to summarise the definitions of SIP
in reviewed literature on intelligence, aging and develop-
ment. That summary is complicated by two facts. First, in
reviewed literature only A. Demetriou explicitly defined SIP
(as maximum speed at which a given mental act may be effi-
ciently executed – Demetriou et al., 2002, 6), while all other
articles contain sentences that only herald the definition of
SIP. To some extent, some of those sentences might be seen as
too general or circular definitions of SIP, while others are
merely a set of operationalisations without necessary abstrac-
tion. The second factor complicating this conclusion is the fact
that the SIP construct has independently emerged in two
research fields under different names, but later on, it was
used and developed through the interrelationship of those
fields – differential and experimental psychology. An addi-
tional problem arose because in neither of these research
fields has a unique approach to the treatment of that con-
struct been adopted to date. For example, Stankov (Stankov,
1999) stresses that in differential psychology biological orient-








emphasise a broad presence of SIP in the structure of intel-
lectual abilities, and its biggest influence on g, while on the
other hand, authors like Horn, Carroll, Sternberg, Roberts
and Stankov do not accept the leading role of SIP in the
human intellect, holding it only for one of several wide cog-
nitive factors. In the information processing approach (i.e.
experimental psychology) a unique definition of SIP also does
not exist, primarily because that research approach is only a
theoretical framework, and not a consistent theory with a
strong organisation of assumptions and propositions, and well-
-specified relations among constructs (McShane, 1991; Salt-
house, 1992).
Nevertheless, from all previously reviewed literature two
different definitions of SIP, belonging to two different tradi-
tions, could be abstracted.
In differential tradition (e.g. Carroll, 1993; Kyllonen,
1994; Nettelbeck, 1994; Deary, 2000; Neubauer & Bucik, 1996;
Neubauer & Knorr, 1998; Stankov & Roberts, 1997) SIP is de-
fined as an important factor in the structure of human cogni-
tive abilities, which reflects the speed of execution of elemen-
tary cognitive processes present in all cognitive tasks (such as
perception, encoding, short-term memory scanning, long-
-term memory retrieval, comparison, etc.). The most frequent
measures of SIP are reaction times (in chronometric design)
and time per task (in paper and pencil design) in elementary
cognitive tasks (ECT). An ECT is defined as "any one of possi-
bly a very large number of tasks in which a person under-
takes, or is assigned, a performance for which there is a speci-
fiable class of "successful" or "correct" outcomes or end states
which are to be attained through a relatively small number of
mental processes or operations, and whose successful out-
comes depend on the instructions given to, or the sets or plans
adopted by, the person." (Carroll, 1993, 10).
In experimental tradition (e.g. Sternberg, 1966; Posner &
Mitchel, 1967; Shepard & Metzler, 1971; Wickens, 1974; Ce-
rella, 1985; Myerson et al., 1990; Levy & Pashler, 1995) SIP is a
common characteristic of every cognitive process, which re-
flects the duration of information transformation in that
process during execution of any information-processing task.
Information-processing task is defined as any cognitive de-
manding task in which a person has to register some aspects
of the presented task situation, transform them in his/her cog-
nitive system into a set of information which will be inter-
connected, or connected with existing information in the me-
mory, compare them and finally, produce some observable
response.
From these two complementary definitions numerous







in Salthouse's analysis of aging and measures of processing
speed (Salthouse, 2000):
1. Decision speed (time to respond in cognitive tests with
moderately complex content)
2. Perceptual speed (speed of responding in paper and
pencil tests with simple content in which everyone would be
perfect if there were no time limits)
3. Psychomotor speed (typically assessed with relatively
simple tasks requiring repetitive finger tapping, or marking
or drawing lines in specified locations on a peace of paper)
4. Chronometric speed (reaction time tasks such as choice
reaction time with visual stimuli and manual key-press re-
sponses)
5. Psychophysical speed (tasks of decision accuracy with
briefly presented visual or auditory stimuli)
6. Psycho physiological measures of speed (time course
of internal responses on any ECT, e.g. latency of particular
components of the event-related potential).
As a final remark in this section, one common property
of all measures of SIP, which is taken for granted, should be
stressed. Namely, if a closer look at all the mentioned mea-
sures of SIP (either in Salthouse's classification, or in the
Appendix of this paper) is taken, it is obvious that they are ba-
sically presented by one quantity – the minimal duration of
solving some cognitive task, or of its neurological processes.
That means, that in the largest number of cases the SIP mea-
sure is time quantity, except in those that use a measurement
paradigm similar to Jensen's paradigm with the Hick appara-
tus (Vernon, 1990), where SIP is measured as an amount of
information (measured in bits) processed in a unit of time.
None other than that measure of SIP coincides with the phys-
ical definition of the rate of any process, which states that the
rate of a process is the time change of the quantity trans-
formed in the process, i.e. dQ/dt (where Q = quantity, t = time)
(Feynman et al., 1977). It should be stressed here that in phy-
sics an appropriate term for time change of any process is not
"speed" but "rate" (since speed denotes only time change of
displacement), and some cognitive psychologists did recog-
nize that (Cerella, 1985; Cerella & Hale, 1994).
In that context, the important question is why SIP (which
is a concept overtaken from natural and technical sciences) is
measured by the time of duration of the cognitive process
during solving some cognitive task, and not by the amount of
information processed in the time of solving that task? There
is only one acceptable answer to this question that greatly
depends on how the amount of information processed dur-








In order to differentiate the subjects according to SIP in
some cognitive task, it is not necessary to know the amount
of information processed in the task because it is the same for
every subject solving the same task. Therefore, only the time
of answering is sufficient for their differentiation. Using the
above physical definition of speed of some process, dQ is con-
stant and only dt varies, thus becoming sufficient for subject
differentiation.
The assumption that dQ is equal for every subject solving
the task implies that the amount of information processed in
the task reflects: (1) the totality of physical information con-
tained in the task situation without selection of any specific
information, or (2) a defined amount of information selected
from the task situation in exactly the same way by every sub-
ject solving the task.
The first explanation of amount of information might be
appropriate because the totality of physical information is the
same for any subject solving the same task in the same phys-
ical conditions, but the question is: do we have this identical
task situation for every subject, in every trial? Additionally,
this explanation of the amount of information is not consis-
tent with the common measure of amount of information u-
sed in psychology research, defined through the number of
response alternatives (Vernon, 1990).
The second explanation is also questionable, because we
cannot exactly prove that the perceptual organization res-
ponsible for information selection from the task situation is
identical for every subject from trial to trial.
Therefore it is suggested that, if there is a tendency of
explaining human cognitive functioning in terms of cognitive
neuroscience a more appropriate term for all this time mea-
suring used in research of the SIP phenomena would be "time
of information processing", instead of "speed of information
processing". After all, that was the term used by some authors
in several papers (Wickens, 1974; Myerson et al., 1990; Kail,
1991a; Kail & Park, 1994; Kail, 1997). On the other hand, if mo-
delling of human cognitive functioning is not firmly integrat-
ed in the theoretical frame of cognitive neuroscience (and does
not lean on the physical definition of the rate of a process),
then SIP might be expressed by time measures of solving cog-
nitive tasks.
PROPOSAL FOR A BETTER SOLUTION: ABANDONING
THE SIP CONSTRUCT AND INTRODUCING THE RCP PROPERTY
When summarising the previous discussion, several prob-
lems concerning the SIP construct are relevant:
1. There is no consensual and unique definition of SIP







use of that construct in any model, or aspect of human intel-
lectual functioning.
2. Although the SIP construct is predominantly defined
by the meaning in the information processing approach to
cognitive functioning and related analogy to computer infor-
mation processing, the purely time definition of its measures
is not consistent with computer processing analogy. In other
words, measures of the construct are not consistently derived
from the theoretical framework which the construct origi-
nates from.
3. Measures of SIP used in several research fields severe-
ly question construct validity of the SIP. There are too many
different measures, some of them represent other constructs
in other research fields (or even in the same field), and there
is no validity agreement concerning particular SIP measures
among different authors.
4. The mechanism, or the nature of age changes of SIP is
not consistently explained with existing definitions and oper-
ationalisations of the construct (in spite of the fact that nu-
merous researches were conducted in the last 20 years).
5. Those theoretical models that aim to explain human
cognitive functioning by introducing the equivalent role of
SIP, WM, and attention in different forms of the human pro-
cessing system (and which are, at present, the dominant mo-
dels), generate at least partial inconsistency concerning the
material basis of that processing system. Namely, WM and
attention are recognised as cognitive neurosystems and SIP is
not.
How serious are these problems with the SIP construct?
The problem concerning the lack of unique definition is
not a rare phenomenon in psychology. Therefore SIP is not in
a worse position than many other psychological constructs.
Consequences of inconsistency of SIP measures with
computer processing analogy depend on how strong we stick
to this analogy in modelling the human mind. Since this anal-
ogy has confined scientific value, we should not be too much
concerned with this inconsistency.
However, the last three problems of the SIP construct
mentioned above call for the proposal of quite a different
explanation of SIP phenomena, which might resolve the ex-
isting problems elaborated above. That explanation is based
on the experimental tradition of the SIP definition and some
common assumptions of cognitive neuroscience, but also on
some biological properties of the phenomena.
Before the elaboration of explicit fundamental assump-
tions of the new proposal, it is important to stress that the
speed of information processing construct (with related nu-








in the proposal while the rate of cognitive process property is
introduced instead.
The assumptions of the new proposal are:
A. The rate of cognitive process (RCP) is one of the gen-
eral properties of every cognitive process that takes place du-
ring execution of any cognitive task;
B. Every cognitive process (activated during execution of
any cognitive task) has its physical basis, which means that it
takes place in a defined space, in real time, and through de-
fined energy transformation;
C. RCP is a general property that emerges from the time
determination of any cognitive process.4 From time determi-
nation of cognitive processes emerge at least three additional
general properties (which will be explained in short later): sta-
bility, endurance and adaptability of cognitive process;
D. Every cognitive process takes place in a defined cog-
nitive subsystem (of the whole cognitive system called mind),
which has its material, i.e. biological basis in the form of de-
fined neural circuits activated during the task execution in de-
fined parts of the brain;
E. The biological basis of the cognitive subsystem activat-
ed during cognitive task execution (i.e. cognitive process) is –
unlike a computer system – functionally unreliable and is not
permanently defined (i.e. different neural circuits can execute
the same cognitive processes, but with different success). All
functional properties of the biological basis are a consequence
of physical characteristics of neural cells and interaction of
their activity.
Before deriving the RCP definition from previous as-
sumptions, I would like to stress the time nature of that defi-
nition. It is primarily a consequence of the fact that psycho-
logical research uses mostly behavioural measures of exam-
ined phenomena and therefore, space and energy determi-
nation of cognitive processes (realised through very sensitive
electric activity in a very confined space of the brain size) are
mostly out of reach of regular psychological measurements.5
Therefore, the rate of cognitive process (RCP) is defined
as the minimal time needed for successful execution of the
cognitive task that generates the related cognitive process (or,
during which that cognitive process takes place).
There are a few related issues to this definition, which
are inevitable for its operationalisation:
(i) Cognitive process is defined by related cognitive task;
(ii) To get a reliable measure of someone's RCP in a relat-
ed cognitive task, the person has to successfully execute at le-
ast a certain number of parallel forms of a particular cognitive
task (which might be also a certain number of trials in the








(iii) Minimal time assessment in some cognitive task might
be expressed by various functions of at least one of the short-
est response times in a successfully executed parallel task (e.g.
minimal time might be assessed by an average of three res-
ponse times that have minimal values – 1st, 2nd, and 3rd the
shortest response time).
The first important question for this new proposal is:
have we solved the problems of the SIP construct by intro-
ducing the RCP property with related definition and propo-
sitions for its measures?
Firstly, this proposal offers quite a precise definition of
RCP that can be unambiguously used in any model of cogni-
tive functioning. Moreover, that definition comprehends all
previous definitions of SIP in different research traditions
without contradictions, but to the level of measures.
Secondly, by leaving out the concept of "information" from
the RCP definition, we departed from computer processing
analogy, and avoided problems with the amount of processed
information during the execution of some cognitive task.
Thirdly, instead of continuous debate on what is the most
appropriate measure of SIP and related number of inconsis-
tencies concerning the particular cognitive tasks, the propos-
al clearly states that the response time of any cognitive task
can be used as a measure of RCP, since RCP is common prop-
erty of every cognitive task execution.
With regard to the fourth problem the answer could be
elaborated to the extent to which SIP measures are correlated
to RCP measures. Namely, SIP is mostly assessed by the aver-
age response time in a set of tasks/trials contained in some
cognitive test related to SIP, while RCP is measured by previ-
ously described related minimal time assessment. Neverthe-
less, these two measures should be relatively highly correlat-
ed, and the answer to global versus domain specific hypothe-
ses follows. RCP is predominantly biologically determined,
which follows from the assumptions of the new proposal and
from the fact that it comprises SIP – which is known to be pre-
dominantly biologically determined (Myerson et al., 1990;
Salthouse, 1996, 2000; Hale et al., 1993; Hale & Jansen, 1994;
Cerella & Hale, 1994; Eaton & Ritchot, 1995; Travis, 1998; Rose
et al., 2002). Because of the predominant biological determi-
nation of RCP, the age changes of RCP are domain specific to
that extent to which the age related changes of biological base
are domain specific. A certain number of nervous system com-
ponents change independently of other components during
the life span, and therefore, with specific methodology and
data analysis we get results that point to the more domain
specific nature of the age changes of RCP. On the other hand,
a great part of the biological basis of related cognitive subsys-








cross different cognitive tasks, and therefore age changes of
response times in those tasks are also shared, pointing at the
global nature of age changes of RCP. Additionally, a great deal
of shared experience and positive transfer across different
task execution also contributes to the global hypotheses ex-
planation.
The fifth problem related with the SIP construct, in the
proposed model of cognitive processes appears to be only a
consequence of mixing two important aspects of the human
processing system, which statistical procedures cannot differ-
entiate. One aspect represents a set of important cognitive
neurosystems, which are subsystems of the whole cognitive
system of the human mind, in this case – working memory
and attention. Another aspect represents a general property
of any cognitive subsystem that reflects its efficiency, specifi-
cally – the rate of cognitive process (RCP). Since, on one hand,
behavioural measures of these two aspects of the human pro-
cessing system do not reflect the nature of related constructs
and, on the other hand, both of them are very important for
processing system functioning, statistical procedures give them
equivalent position in the structure of human intellect.
An obvious consequence of the RCP property is the fact
that WM and attention (and any other cognitive neurosys-
tem) have their own RCP when they are in function during
some cognitive task execution, and that fact is already present
in some SIP measures. For example, Memory scanning test for
working memory RCP, Stroop colour test for selective atten-
tion RCP, Multitask word classification task for divided atten-
tion RCP (see Appendix).
The second important question for RCP proposal is
whether it contradicts in any way the empirical data related
to the SIP construct. So far, the answer is no.
Since RCP is a general property of any cognitive process
that greatly determines the efficiency of related cognitive task
execution, RCP must have a high position in any intelligence
model – which has been proved in all the data in contempo-
rary SIP-intelligence relationship research (Nettelbeck, 1994;
Neubauer & Knorr, 1998; Stankov & Roberts, 1997; Vernon,
1990). The fact that SIP correlates with a wide range of cogni-
tive variables is comprised in the fact that RCP is an integral
part of any cognitive variable by its definition – even if so-
-called nonspeeded variables are concerned (Hale & Jansen,
1994; Kail & Hall, 1994; Kail, 1997).
Research data on the age related changes of SIP, provide
an even better theoretical framework for modelling cognitive
development with introduction of the RCP property. First of
all, RCP offers a solution for the global vs. domain specific
life-span SIP development dilemma (as it was previously ex-







previous SIP development for successive WM capacity devel-
opment (Fry & Hale, 2000; Kail & Park, 1994; Salthouse, 1991;
Verhaeghen & Salthouse, 1997) are theoretically more under-
standable with introduction of the RCP property instead of
using the SIP construct. Reason: RCP is more integrated with
the WM capacity than SIP, since it represents one property of
that cognitive neurosystem, and capacity represents another
property of the same neurosystem. Thirdly, most of the re-
search data and theoretical models suggest biological mecha-
nisms as the predominant ones for age changes of SIP, although
they do not neglect experience and positive transfer between
cognitive tasks (Eaton & Ritchot, 1995; Hale, 1990; Hale et al.,
1993; Kail, 1986; Myerson et al., 1990; Rose et al., 2002; Salt-
house, 1996, 2000; Travis, 1998). That fits the RCP concept e-
ven more, since – primarily from the D and E assumptions of
the RCP definition – the predominantly biological nature of
RCP is obvious (as it has already been mentioned).
When discussing the predominantly biological nature of
the RCP property, one must point out its concordance with
one aspect of the SIP construct that makes the construction of
a multidisciplinary integrated picture of human cognitive functio-
ning possible. Namely, in life-span development and differ-
ential research of human cognitive functioning, there are
authors that point to processing speed as a bridging construct
between behavioural and neurophysiological research (Salt-
house, 1996; Roberts & Pallier, 2001). This is primarily because
of the time measure of SIP, which is an objective and absolute
dimension, rather then a norm reference scale (as it is the case
with most behavioural measures) – and as such, it is inher-
ently meaningful in all disciplines. Additionally, the biological
nature of RCP keeps strengthening this behavioural-neuro-
physiological bridging, because it binds biological characteris-
tics of cognitive subsystems during processes (observable by
contemporary neuroimaging techniques) with behavioural
data in the form of response time.
As previously announced, besides RCP, cognitive pro-
cesses have at least three additional general properties,6 which
are predominantly related to the mentioned biological char-
acteristics of cognitive subsystems activated during some cog-
nitive process, but also to the previous experience.
Stability of cognitive process (SCP) is defined as an aver-
age response time variation of successful execution of cognitive
task that generates related cognitive process. Average response
time variation in some cognitive task might be some function
of the differences between minimal time assessment (RCP)
and every other response time in a given set of parallel tasks.
Adaptability of cognitive process (ACP) is defined as a
growth of response time efficiency in successful execution of








increasing number of a task. A possible ACP measure might
be the ratio of some function of response times in the first, and
in the last half of a given set of tasks.
Endurance of cognitive process (ECP) is negatively
defined as an increment of response times in successfully exe-
cuted cognitive task (that generates related cognitive process)
with increasing number of a task. A possible ECP measure
might be the slope of the curve that presents response time as
a function of task number in a given set of tasks. ECP can be
assessed only when the given cognitive subsystem is finally
adapted to cognitive task, i.e. when related response time
does not decrease with further solving of the cognitive task.
Finally, we might ask how new is the proposal of RCP and
other general properties of cognitive processes?
The fact that processing speed may reflect overall effi-
ciency of the nervous system is already explained in the liter-
ature (Hale and Jansen, 1994), which partially corroborates
the newly proposed definition of RCP. Recent multitask ex-
periments go in the same direction, when suggesting SIP
should be viewed as a general or task-independent construct
(Fry and Hale, 2000).
Dynamic properties such as speed, stability and endu-
rance of neural system measured with chronometric tests are
systematically explained in the psychodiagnostic work of
Mirko Drenovac, which theoretically leans on Russian neuro-
physiology (Drenovac, 2001). Moreover, Drenovac's psycho-
diagnostic concept has already been tested in research of cog-
nitive development (@ivi~njak et al., 2001).
The concept of stability of processing can be found under
different names (e.g. within-subject performance variability,
response consistency, stability) in developmental (Hale et al.,
1993), differential (Roberts & Pallier, 2001) and cognitive neu-
roscience (Clearfield & Thelen, 2001) literature on cognitive
functioning. Adaptability is a less known property of cogni-
tive processes, but it has appropriate analogy in the flexibility
concept analysed in the dynamic system theory applied in de-
velopmental cognitive neuroscience (Clearfield & Thelen, 2001).
Bearing in mind all previously mentioned facts, it should
be concluded that the RCP proposal for solving problematic
aspects of SIP phenomena synthesises the existing data and
theories with new ideas and insights. However, empirical va-
lidation needs still to be undertaken.
NOTES
1 The author has collected the data by reviewing chapters of several
books concerned with human intellectual functioning and the con-
tents of 42 research papers dealing with different aspects of SIP (24
of them were empirical research papers, 11 were reviews and 7 were







2 Three of them were from the same author, A. Demetriou.
3 Reading aloud a single word should be less demanding then search-
ing for several identical objects in a bigger set of objects, and cross-
ing them out when found.
4 In this paper we won't analyse space and energy determination of
cognitive processes since they are not related to proposed measures
of speed of cognitive process, and because that analysis demands
systematic introduction of contemporary neuroimaging techniques.
5 But not completely – ERP techniques, and techniques of neuro-
imaging are more and more in psychological use.
6 We say at least because the capacity of some cognitive neurosys-
tems (e.g. WM) emerges from energy determination of cognitive
processes, which we won't discuss in this paper.
APPENDIX
1. Measures of SIP used in reviewed
cognitive development researches
1. Abstract matching (e.g. Hale, 1990; Hale & Jansen 1994) 30. Mental rotation* (e.g. Chi, 1977; Kail, 1986; Hale, 1990)
2. Analogies (e.g. Kail, 1991b) 31. Name retrieval task (e.g. Kail, 1986)
3. Arrows test (e.g. Miller & Vernon, 1997) 32. Number comparison test (e.g. Kail & Park, 1994)
4. Category retrieval (e.g. Kail, 1986) 33. Number of trials to criterion (habituation)
(e.g. Rose et al., 2002)
5. Choice reaction time (RT)* (e.g. Hale, 1990; Kail, 1991b) 34. Number test (e.g. Miller & Vernon, 1997)
6. Classification (e.g. Kail, 1991b; Eaton & Ritchot, 1995) 35. Numerical speed (e.g. Demetriou et al., 2002)
7. Coding test (e.g.Kail, 1991a; Kail & Hall, 1994) 36. P3 latency (e.g. Ridderinkhof & van der Molen, 1997)
8. Colour string test (e.g. Miller & Vernon, 1997) 37. P300 latency (e.g. Travis, 1998)
9. Colour test (e.g. Miller & Vernon, 1997) 38. Pegboard (e.g. Kail, 1991a)
10. Continuous tracking tasks (e.g. Wickens, 1974) 39. Picture identification (e.g. Fry & Hale, 2000)
11. Cross-out test (WJ-R) (e.g. Kail & Hall, 1994) 40. Picture-sentence matching (e.g. Kail, 1991b)
12. Eriksen-Flanker selective attention RT 41. Quantification (e.g. Kail, 1991b)
(e.g. Ridderinkhof & van der Molen, 1997)
13. Identical pictures test (e.g. Kail & Park, 1994) 42. Reading (e.g. Chi, 1977; Kail, 1991b)
14. Imaginal speed (e.g. Demetriou et al., 2002) 43. Recognition memory (e.g. Kail, 1991b)
15. Inspection time (e.g. Fry & Hale, 2000) 44. Same-different judgements* (e.g. Kail, 1991b)
16. Judgements of acoustic & semantic features 45. Search tasks (visual) (e.g. Chi, 1977; Kail, 1991b)
(e.g. Kail, 1991b)
17. Judging sentence truth (e.g. Kail, 1991b) 46. Sentence completions RT (e.g. Fry & Hale, 2000)
18. Judgments of category membership (e.g. Kail, 1991b) 47. Shape string test (e.g. Miller & Vernon, 1997)
19. Judgments of inequality (e.g. Kail, 1991b) 48. Shape test (e.g. Miller & Vernon, 1997)
20. Letter matching task (e.g. Hale, 1990) 49. Simple RT (e.g. Hale, 1990; Kail, 1991a)
21. Line-length discrimination (e.g. Hale & Jansen, 1994) 50. Size test (e.g. Miller & Vernon, 1997)
22. LRP onset (e.g. Ridderinkhof & van der Molen, 1997) 51. Stroop task (e.g. Kail, 1991b)
23. Mapping analogies* (e.g. Kail, 1986) 52. Tachistoscopic recognition tasks (e.g. Wickens, 1974)
24. Matching test (e.g. Miller & Vernon, 1997) 53. Tapping (e.g. Kail, 1991a)
25. Matching to sample task (e.g. Kail, 1991b) 54. Temporal judgments (e.g. Kail, 199b)
26. Matrix solutions RT (e.g. Fry & Hale, 2000) 55. Total looking to the familiar (habituation)
(e.g. Rose et al., 2002)
27. Memory scanning for digits* (Kail, 1986) 56. Verbal analogies* (e.g. Hale, 1990)
28. Mental arithmetic tasks* (e.g. Chi, 1977; Kail, 1991a) 57. Verbal speed (e.g. Demetriou et al., 2002)
29. Mental paper folding (e.g. Hale & Jansen, 1994) 58. Visual matching test (WJ-R)* (e.g. Kail & Hall, 1994)
(these cognitive development SIP measures are derived by reviewing 15 empirical research papers, 6 reviews, and 3 theoreti-
cal papers – mentioned in Literature)
2. Measures of SIP used in reviewed cognitive aging researches
1. Alerted RT (e.g. Cerella, 1985) 17. Memory scanning* (e.g. Cerella, 1985)
2. Alerted stimulus discrimination (e.g. Cerella, 1985) 18. Mental rotation* (e.g. Myerson et al., 1990)
3. Arithmetic time (e.g. Salthouse, 1994b) 19. Multiple response choice reaction time
(e.g. Myerson et al., 1990)







5. Choice RT* (e.g. Myerson et al., 1990) 21. Paired associate (e.g. Cerella, 1985)
6. Cued RT* (e.g. Myerson et al., 1990) 22. Pattern comparison (e.g. Salthouse, 1994a)
7. Digit copy (e.g. Salthouse, 1994a) 23. Playing card classification (e.g. Cerella, 1985)
8. Digit-symbol substitution (e.g. Myerson et al., 1990) 24. Rotated figures (e.g. Myerson et al., 1990)
9. ERP-latency (e.g. Salthouse, 2000) 25. Series completion decision time (e.g. Salthouse, 1994b)
10. Finger tapping* (e.g. Salthouse, 2000) 26. Simple RT* (e.g. Myerson et al., 1990)
11. Geometric analogies decision time (e.g. Salthouse, 1994b) 27. Speed of test taking (e.g. Stankov, 1999)
12. Horizontal line marking (e.g. Salthouse, 1994b) 28. Stimulus decoding (e.g. Cerella, 1985)
13. Inspection time* (e.g. Salthouse, 2000) 29. Stimulus discrimination (RT & card sorting time)*
(e.g. Cerella, 1985)
14. Letter copy (e.g. Salthouse, 1994b) 30. Vertical line marking (e.g. Salthouse, 1994b)
15. Letter matching/comparison* (e.g. Myerson et al., 1990) 31. Word matching* (e.g. Myerson et al., 1990)
16. Line length discrimination* (e.g. Cerella, 1985) 32. Word switch (e.g. Salthouse, 1994b)
(these cognitive aging SIP measures are derived by reviewing 2 empirical research papers, 4 reviews, and 4 theoretical papers
– mentioned in Literature)
3. Measures of SIP used in reviewed intelligence researches
1. Arithmetic operator* (e.g. Wilhelm & Schulze, 2002) 20. Modified Blink Reflex Latency
(e.g. Smyth, Anderson & Hammond, 1999)
2. Binary Reaction Task (e.g. Roberts & Pallier, 2001) 21. Multitask Card-Sorting (e.g. Roberts & Pallier, 2001)
3. Choice reaction and mental arithmetic task 22. Multitask Word-Classification (e.g. Roberts & Pallier, 2001)
(e.g. Neubauer et al. 2000)
4. Classification of words* (e.g. Wilhelm & Schulze, 2002) 23. Number Comparison Test* (e.g. Roberts et al., 1996)
5. Coding Substitution Task (e.g. Nettelbeck, 1994) 24. Odd-man-out task (e.g. Vernon, 1994)
6. Coding test* (e.g. Neubauer & Knorr, 1998) 25. Old English (e.g. Wilhelm & Schulze, 2002)
7. Colorado Perceptual Speed Test 26. Part-whole (e.g. Wilhelm & Schulze, 2002)
(e.g. Neubauer et al. 2000)
8. Complex Choice Reaction Task* 27. Rapid Automatic Naming Test (e.g. Neubauer et al. 2000)
(e.g. Roberts & Pallier, 2001)
9. Crossing out letters* (e.g. Wilhelm & Schulze, 2002) 28. Sentence Verification Task (e.g. Roberts & Pallier, 2001)
10. Digit-symbol substitution* 29. Seven divisible (e.g. Wilhelm & Schulze, 2002)
(e.g. Wilhelm & Schulze, 2002)
11. Fitt's Movement Task (e.g. Roberts & Pallier, 2001) 30. Single Card-Sorting Task (e.g. Roberts & Pallier, 2001)
12. Incomplete words (e.g. Wilhelm & Schulze, 2002) 31. Single Response Choice Reaction Task
(e.g. Roberts & Pallier, 2001)
13. Inspection time* (e.g. Neubauer & Knorr, 1998) 32. Single Word-Classification Task
(e.g. Roberts & Pallier, 2001)
14. Joystick Reaction Task (e.g. Roberts & Pallier, 2001) 33. Stimulus discrimination test (e.g. Neubauer & Knorr, 1998)
15. Letter matching test* (e.g. Neubauer & Knorr, 1998) 34. String Search Test (e.g. Roberts et al., 1996)
16. Letter Reading Test from Kurztest für Allgemeine 35. Stroop Colour Test* (e.g. Roberts et al., 1996)
Intelligenz (e.g. Roberts et al., 1996)
17. Memory scanning test (e.g. Neubauer & Knorr, 1998) 36. Tachistoscopic Choice Reaction Task
(e.g. Roberts & Pallier, 2001)
18. Memory Span Test from Kurztest für 37. x Greater (e.g. Wilhelm & Schulze, 2002)
Allgemeine Intelligenz (e.g. Roberts et al., 1996)
19. Mental rotations task (e.g. Roberts & Pallier, 2001) 38. Zahlen-Verbindungs Test (e.g. Neubauer & Knorr, 1998)
(these intelligence SIP measures are derived by reviewing 7 empirical research papers and 1 review– mentioned in Literature)
* Measures of SIP marked by asterix denote the ones that replicate among these three reviewed research fields, or belong to the
variations of one task (they have the same logic and processing complexity, but different stimulus and response modality). They
are not counted as different SIP measures (otherwise, the number of SIP measures in this review would be greater than 98).
** Since 11 of 42 papers were reviews without detailed description of SIP measures, we took quite a conservative strategy in
denoting some measures as different. Nevertheless, it may happen that a few more of the mentioned measures are only design
variations of the same task.
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Doprinos analizi ljudske brzine obradbe
podataka: razvojni i diferencijalni argumenti
Mislav Stjepan @EBEC
Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, Zagreb
Ljudska brzina obradbe podataka (BOP) istra`iva~ki je konstrukt
koji je u psihologiji pod razli~itim imenima i s razli~itim inten-
zitetom istra`ivan vi{e od 60 godina. Njegova va`nost sa`eto je
opisana u ~etiri istra`iva~ka podru~ja: diferencijalna i eksperi-







to da je to va`na sastavnica suvremenih modela inteligencije te
istra`ivanja cjelo`ivotnoga kognitivnog razvoja, nu`no je poku{ati
izgraditi integriranu sliku toga konstrukta. Pregled i sustavna
analiza 42 znanstvena ~lanka i dodatne literature s toga
podru~ja pokazali su da postoje problemi s konstruktnom
valjano{}u BOP-a, ali i odre|ene teorijske i empirijske
nekonzistentnosti. Iznesen je nov prijedlog za obja{njenje brzine
obradbe podataka koji napu{ta BOP s pripadnim mjerama, a
uvodi se svojstvo BKP (brzina kognitivnoga procesa) kao jedno
od nekoliko op}ih svojstava svakoga kognitivnog procesa.
Beitrag zur Analyse der Geschwindigkeit 




Ivo-Pilar-Institut für Gesellschaftswissenschaften, Zagreb
Die Geschwindigkeit der Datenauswertung durch den Menschen
ist ein von Forschern geschaffenes Konstrukt, das in der Psycho-
logie unter verschiedenen Bezeichnungen und mit schwankender
Intensität seit mehr als 60 Jahren untersucht wird. Die Bedeutung
dieses Phänomens wird anhand von vier Forschungsbereichen
knapp umrissen. Das sind: Differentielle und Experimentelle
Psychologie, Altern und kognitive Entwicklung. Da die Geschwin-
digkeit der Datenauswertung durch den Menschen einen wich-
tigen Bestandteil zeitgenössischer Intelligenzmodelle sowie
wissenschaftlicher Forschungen zur lebenslangen Fortentwicklung
des Menschen darstellt, muss versucht werden, ein integratives
Bild dieses Konstruktes zu entwerfen. Die Durchsicht und sys-
tematische Analyse von 42 wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten sowie
weiterer fachliterarischer Texte zu diesem Thema ergab, dass das
Konstrukt der Geschwindigkeit der Datenauswertung durch den
Menschen in mancherlei Hinsicht problematisch ist und dass es
gewisse theoretische und empirische Inkonsistenzen aufweist. Der
Verfasser nimmt Abstand von diesem Konstrukt und seinen bezüg-
lichen Werten und schlägt einen neuen Versuch zur Erklärung der
Geschwindigkeit der Datenauswertung durch den Menschen vor.
Er führt den Begriff der Eigenschaft der Geschwindigkeit des
kognitiven Prozesses ein – als eine von mehreren allgemeinen
Eigenschaften eines jeden Erkenntnisvorgangs.
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